# Publications

**Generalized update semantics**

* Mind * 2018 (accepted pending minor changes) | draft

**Homogenous alternative semantics**

* Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium * 2017 | final

**A stronger doctrine of double effect**

* Australasian Journal of Philosophy * 2017 | final

**Informative dynamic semantics**

* Rutgers University * 2017 | final draft

**Triviality results for probabilistic modals**

*transparent*. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. These same theorists have also defended

*non-factualist*theories of probabilistic modals. On this view, probabilistic sentences do not express propositions; rather, they are semantically associated with sets of probability functions. But what exactly is the connection between transparency and nonfactualism? In this paper, I prove a triviality result for probabilistic modals. If these modals satisfy transparency, then they cannot express propositions: they must be nonfactual. However, there is a problem for nonfactualism. I formulate another version of transparency as a principle governing the logic of the probabilistic modal

*n% likely*. I then prove some impossibility results, showing that this second transparency thesis is incompatible with

*n% likely*obeying the probability calculus.

* Philosophy and Phenomenological Research * 2017 | final draft

**Believing epistemic contradictions**

* The Review of Symbolic Logic * 2017
| final draft

**A preface paradox for intention**

* Philosophers' Imprint * 2016 | final